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    The autonomy of the 'I' can be neither pure nor rigorous ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The autonomy of the 'I' can be neither pure nor rigorous and cannot form the basis for a simple and linear differentiation of the human from the animal.

    Consciousness & MindMoral Responsibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Auto-position and autotely of the 'I' implies the 'I' to be an other that must welcome within itself some irreducible hetero-affection.
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    • 2.If the 'I' requires irreducible hetero-affection, then the autonomy of the 'I' is not pure or rigorous.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kant's transcendental unity of apperception establishes the 'I think' as a formal condition of experience that precedes empirical hetero-affection.
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    • 2.A condition of possibility for experience need not share the contingent features of what it makes possible, so hetero-affection cannot contaminate transcendental autonomy.
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    • 3.If transcendental autonomy is a structural precondition rather than an empirical achievement, Derrida's genetic account of the 'I' misidentifies the relevant level of analysis.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Christine Korsgaard argues that reflective self-constitution—the capacity to endorse or reject one's impulses through normative self-governance—is a uniquely human form of practical identity.
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    • 2.The presence of hetero-affective inputs does not dissolve autonomous self-constitution, because autonomy consists in how an agent reflects on and endorses those inputs, not in their absence.
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    • 3.A sharp human-animal distinction can therefore be grounded in the degree and kind of reflective endorsement, not in any impossible purity of self-origination.
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    Related

    A condition of possibility for experience need not share the contingent features...A sharp human-animal distinction can therefore be grounded in the degree and kin...Auto-position and autotely of the 'I' implies the 'I' to be an other that must w...Christine Korsgaard argues that reflective self-constitution—the capacity to end...
    +4 moreShow less
    If the 'I' requires irreducible hetero-affection, then the autonomy of the 'I' i...If transcendental autonomy is a structural precondition rather than an empirical...Kant's transcendental unity of apperception establishes the 'I think' as a forma...The presence of hetero-affective inputs does not dissolve autonomous self-consti...

    Similar

    If the 'I' requires irreducible hetero-affection, then the autonomy of...80%If autonomy means only the ability to govern oneself regardless of how...79%Our autonomy should not be regarded as equally worthy across all perso...78%Positing a substantive conception of autonomy as the basis for interpe...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: derrida
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    So far, we can say that the argument is quite simple although it has wide-ranging implications. It is based on an analysis of experience, but it is also based in the experience of what Derrida has called “auto-affection.” We find the idea of auto-affection (or self-affection) in ancient Greek philosophy, for example in Aristotle’s definition of God as “thought thinking itself.” Auto-affection occurs when I affect myself, when the affecting is the same as the affected. As we said above, Derrida w
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit