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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The claim that things have temporal parts if and only if the past and future exist has a peculiar consequence.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.The biconditional conflates ontological commitment to temporal parts with metaphysical claims about the reality of tense, which are logically independent.
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    • 2.Sider's 'four-dimensionalism' explicitly allows that perdurance is compatible with presentism if temporal parts are construed as instantaneous intrinsic property-bearers rather than requiring robust past/future ontology.
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    • 3.Therefore, the existence of temporal parts does not entail eternalism, severing the biconditional's right-to-left direction.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Haslanger's distinction between 'property-variation perdurance' and 'mereological perdurance' shows that processes can have temporal parts under a thin ontology that does not commit to the full reality of past and future.
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    • 2.If processes perduring requires only that they have successive stages picked out by our descriptions rather than robustly real future entities, then endurantists can coherently accept process perdurance without accepting an eternalist ontology.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If this biconditional holds, there can be no mixed worlds in which some things perdure and others endure.
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    • 2.Most endurantists think that processes perdure, which would require a mixed world.
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