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    The conceivability argument requires the ideal conceivabi... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The conceivability argument against materialism fails because the ideally conceivable world in the vicinity is only a structural zombie world, not a full-fledged zombie world.

    The conceivability argument requires the ideal conceivability of a full-fledged zombie world that duplicates both structural and quiddistic features.

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    Modality & PossibilityConsciousness & Mind

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    A structural zombie world lacks consciousness but duplicates only structural fea...If there is an ideally conceivable world in the vicinity of the imagined zombie ...The conceivability argument against materialism fails because the ideally concei...

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    The conceivability argument against materialism fails because the idea...88%If there is an ideally conceivable world in the vicinity of the imagin...85%A structural zombie world lacks consciousness but duplicates only stru...82%The anti-physicalist zombie argument requires metaphysical possibility...81%

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    SEP: russellian-monism
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    That response can be developed in different ways, such as rejecting epistemic premises on which the anti-materialist arguments rely (for other ways, see Chalmers 2010: 134–35; Pereboom 2011; Alter and Nagasawa 2012: 83–86). Regarding the conceivability argument, Russellian physicalists can argue as follows. On reflection, a zombie world is not ideally conceivable. If such a world initially appears conceivable, this is because we mistake a zombie world for a structural zombie world: a consciousne

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