The conceivability argument against materialism fails because the ideally conceivable world in the vicinity is only a structural zombie world, not a full-fledged zombie world.

Consciousness & Mind Modality & Possibility

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1.If there is an ideally conceivable world in the vicinity of the imagined zombie world, that world is a structural zombie world.
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2.A structural zombie world lacks consciousness but duplicates only structural features, not quiddistic features.
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3.The conceivability argument requires the ideal conceivability of a full-fledged zombie world that duplicates both structural and quiddistic features.
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SEP: russellian-monism

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That response can be developed in different ways, such as rejecting epistemic premises on which the anti-materialist arguments rely (for other ways, see Chalmers 2010: 134–35; Pereboom 2011; Alter and Nagasawa 2012: 83–86). Regarding the conceivability argument, Russellian physicalists can argue as follows. On reflection, a zombie world is not ideally conceivable. If such a world initially appears conceivable, this is because we mistake a zombie world for a structural zombie world: a consciousne

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Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

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Type: claim
Perspectives: 1 (0 for, 1 against)
Edits: 1 edit