The disjunctivist move of positing unseen objects as constituents smuggles in non-phenomenal facts to do the individuation work, changing the subject from phenomenology to metaphysics.

?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

Non-phenomenal facts(in philosophy of perception): Facts about reality that aren't about anyone's conscious experience—for example, the chemical composition of an object or whether it exists outside your mind.
constituents(Hendry's analogical redefinition applied to the relationship between H2O molecules and water): Components that go into making a substance but need not retain exactly the form they started with after combination
disjunctivism(Used by naive realists to respond to the argument from hallucination): The claim that causally matching veridical and hallucinatory experiences are fundamentally different in kind
individuation(Scholastic debate over the principle of individuation): The metaphysical explanation of what makes a particular thing a distinct individual rather than a universal or shared nature

Based on where you are in your exploration