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    The dispute between fictionalism and paraphrase nominalis... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    The dispute between fictionalism and paraphrase nominalism is an empirical dispute about ordinary-language semantics, not a purely metaphysical one.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The question at issue is whether utterances of (P) literally say the same thing as the corresponding sentence (N).
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    • 2.Whether two sentences say the same thing in ordinary language is a question of empirical semantics.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Ordinary speakers lack stable, theoretically consistent intuitions about whether abstract-object talk is literal or figurative.
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    • 2.When linguistic data is too indeterminate to settle a question, the dispute reverts to a metaphysical one about what ontology best systematizes our practices.
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    • 3.Quine's criterion of ontological commitment shows that what a theory 'says there is' depends on regimentation, not ordinary-language meaning.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Field's fictionalism and Burgess-Rosen's paraphrase nominalism disagree not about what sentences mean but about which truths we are obligated to assert sincerely.
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    • 2.A dispute about norms of sincere assertion and ontological obligation is a normative-metaphysical dispute, not an empirical-semantic one.
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    Related

    A dispute about norms of sincere assertion and ontological obligation is a norma...Field's fictionalism and Burgess-Rosen's paraphrase nominalism disagree not abou...Ordinary speakers lack stable, theoretically consistent intuitions about whether...Quine's criterion of ontological commitment shows that what a theory 'says there...
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    The question at issue is whether utterances of (P) literally say the same thing ...When linguistic data is too indeterminate to settle a question, the dispute reve...Whether two sentences say the same thing in ordinary language is a question of e...

    Similar

    Even fictionalist nominalists who deny that (P) is equivalent to (N) c...82%The disagreement between platonism and fictionalism is ontological, no...81%Fictionalistic nominalism about propositions is viable, unlike paraphr...81%Paraphrase nominalism holds that a property-predication sentence (P) i...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: platonism
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    On this view, (P) is equivalent to (N). That is, it says the very same thing. And neither sentence, according to this view, entails the existence of Gness. We can call this a paraphrase-nominalist view of sentences like (P). But nominalists needn't endorse this view. They can also endorse a fictionalist view of sentences like (P). On this view, (P) and (N) do not, strictly speaking, say the same thing, because (P) talks about the property of Gness and (N) does not. According to this fictionalist
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit