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    The distinction between the nature in the particular and ... — Carmelics
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    The distinction between the nature in the particular and the haecceity is a formal distinction

    Personal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The nature and haecceity are not really distinct, since they are not separable
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    • 2.The nature and haecceity are not discrete parts of some whole
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    • 3.There must be some kind of distinction between the nature and the haecceity, since they are both constituents of the particular
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Ockham argues that any genuine distinction beyond a conceptual one entails real separability, leaving no coherent middle ground for a 'formal' distinction.
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    • 2.If nature and haecceity cannot be separated even by divine power, their alleged distinction collapses into a merely conceptual one imposed by the intellect, not found in the thing.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Aquinas holds that individuation is achieved by designated matter alone, making haecceity a superfluous posit that multiplies entities beyond necessity.
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    • 2.If designated matter already fully accounts for numerical distinction among particulars, introducing a formal distinction between nature and haecceity explains nothing that matter does not already explain.
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    Personal IdentityProof of definition segments

    Related

    Aquinas holds that individuation is achieved by designated matter alone, making ...If designated matter already fully accounts for numerical distinction among part...If nature and haecceity cannot be separated even by divine power, their alleged ...Ockham argues that any genuine distinction beyond a conceptual one entails real ...
    +3 moreShow less
    The nature and haecceity are not discrete parts of some wholeThe nature and haecceity are not really distinct, since they are not separableThere must be some kind of distinction between the nature and the haecceity, sin...

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    The distinction between the nature in the particular and the haecceity...94%There must be some kind of distinction between the nature and the haec...92%The nature in the particular and the haecceity are not separable from ...88%The nature and haecceity are not really distinct, since they are not s...86%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: medieval-haecceity
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    I have spoken about consituents in this context: the nature in the particular and the haecceity are in effect constituents of the particular. So there must be some kind of distinction between them. This distinction cannot be real, since according to Scotus real distinction requires separability, and the features are not separable from each other any more than they are separable from themselves. Neither are they anything like discrete parts of some whole. They are, as Scotus puts it, “formally di
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit