The entailment 'e is an experience of something's looking red and square' entails 'e is an experience of something's looking red' follows clearly from the apparent structure of the represented content.

Now notice that there are many entailment relations between qualia-statements—for example, ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx \amp Sq(x)}\)’ entails ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx}\)’, and ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx \amp Tr(x) \amp By \amp Sq(y)}\)’ entails ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx \amp Sq(y)}\)’, and so on. The orthodox representationalist and the sense-datum theorist have simple accounts of these entailments in terms of the structure of the objects of experiences (apparent structure, for the representationalist; actual structure, for