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    The explanatory gap between third-person physical account... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Dualism is a psychological tendency, not a philosophically defensible position.

    The explanatory gap between third-person physical accounts and first-person phenomenal experience (Levine 1983) remains unresolved by idealist dissolution strategies.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Idealism merely relocates the problem: explaining how physical facts constitute mental facts remains distinct from explaining subjective experience itself.
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    • 2.Even if all reality is mental, the gap persists between describing mental properties and accounting for why those properties feel like something.
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    • 3.Idealist solutions conflate ontological reduction with explanatory bridging, leaving the asymmetry between objective description and subjective character unresolved.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.The explanatory gap assumes an illegitimate dualism between 'physical accounts' and 'phenomenal experience'—idealism dissolves this by rejecting the dichotomy entirely.
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    • 2.If consciousness is fundamental rather than derived, there is no gap to bridge; the appearance of a gap reflects only our confused metaphysical framework.
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    • 3.Levine's gap depends on treating first-person and third-person descriptions as irreconcilably different; idealism shows this reflects epistemic limitations, not metaphysical divides.
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    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedSkepticism1 linked

    Related

    Dualism is a psychological tendency, not a philosophically defensible position.Even if all reality is mental, the gap persists between describing mental proper...Idealism merely relocates the problem: explaining how physical facts constitute ...Idealist solutions conflate ontological reduction with explanatory bridging, lea...
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    If consciousness is fundamental rather than derived, there is no gap to bridge; ...Levine's gap depends on treating first-person and third-person descriptions as i...The explanatory gap assumes an illegitimate dualism between 'physical accounts' ...

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