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    Dualism is a psychological tendency, not a philosophicall... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Dualism is a psychological tendency, not a philosophically defensible position.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Finite minds have a natural predisposition to distinguish what is 'outside us' from what is 'in us' when looking at reality.
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    • 2.This predisposition and its conditions, if understood correctly, reveal that the distinction does not reflect genuine metaphysical separateness.
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    • 3.The apparent duality of nature and mind collapses once the conditions of our perspective are properly comprehended.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Descartes' interactionist dualism is grounded in the self-evident indubitability of res cogitans, which resists reduction to any physical description.
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    • 2.The explanatory gap between third-person physical accounts and first-person phenomenal experience (Levine 1983) remains unresolved by idealist dissolution strategies.
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    • 3.Dismissing dualism as mere psychology commits a genetic fallacy: the causal origin of a belief cannot determine its philosophical validity.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Property dualism, as defended by Chalmers, posits phenomenal consciousness as ontologically irreducible without requiring Cartesian substance dualism.
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    • 2.The 'hard problem' of consciousness demonstrates that no third-person physical account logically entails the existence of subjective experience, preserving a principled mind-body distinction.
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    Topics

    SkepticismConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

    2 topics

    Modality & Possibility1 linkedPerception1 linked

    Related

    Descartes' interactionist dualism is grounded in the self-evident indubitability...Dismissing dualism as mere psychology commits a genetic fallacy: the causal orig...Finite minds have a natural predisposition to distinguish what is 'outside us' f...Property dualism, as defended by Chalmers, posits phenomenal consciousness as on...
    +4 moreShow less
    The 'hard problem' of consciousness demonstrates that no third-person physical a...The apparent duality of nature and mind collapses once the conditions of our per...The explanatory gap between third-person physical accounts and first-person phen...

    Similar

    There is no bodily or psychological state over which one might not wis...77%Behaviorism holds that the mental is nothing over and above behavior, ...76%Concepts are mental qualities having the same nature as non-mental qua...75%Blockhead is not a nomic or physical possibility, even if Blockhead is...75%

    Source

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    SEP: idealism
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    Fichte’s dynamic conception of idealism was adopted almost immediately by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854), who in the first period of his philosophical career became next to Fichte the most outspoken defender of this hybrid variety of idealism. In doing so he transformed Fichte’s I-centered approach to reality via an analysis of the conditions of knowledge/cognition and agency into an idealistic version of a monistic ontology. In this he was followed by Hegel. Whereas Fichte had m
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    Details

    This predisposition and its conditions, if understood correctly, reveal that the...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit