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    The first-person perspective must somehow be transferred ... — Carmelics
    Home/Afterlife & Death
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The first-person perspective must somehow be transferred from the original body to the resurrection body.

    Afterlife & Death
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If a person's first-person perspective were extinguished, the person would go out of existence.
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    • 2.What is distinctive of persons is a 'first-person perspective', roughly, the capacity to think of oneself as oneself.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Personal identity consists in continuity of psychological connections (memories, intentions, beliefs), not in an irreducible first-person perspective.
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    • 2.Parfit's reductionist account shows that what matters in survival is psychological connectedness, which admits of degrees and requires no metaphysical 'transfer' of perspective.
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    • 3.If psychological continuity suffices for personal identity, resurrection requires only causal-psychological continuity between bodies, not transmission of a sui generis first-person entity.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The concept of a 'first-person perspective' being transferred presupposes substance dualism, yet Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism treats the soul as form of the body, not a separable perspective-bearer.
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    • 2.On hylomorphic anthropology, God's resurrection of the person requires reconstituting the same matter-form composite, making 'transfer' a category error rather than a genuine requirement.
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    Afterlife & Death

    Related

    If a person's first-person perspective were extinguished, the person would go ou...If psychological continuity suffices for personal identity, resurrection require...On hylomorphic anthropology, God's resurrection of the person requires reconstit...Parfit's reductionist account shows that what matters in survival is psychologic...
    +3 moreShow less
    Personal identity consists in continuity of psychological connections (memories,...The concept of a 'first-person perspective' being transferred presupposes substa...What is distinctive of persons is a 'first-person perspective', roughly, the cap...

    Similar

    What is required is that the first-person perspective of the resurrect...92%Since persons are not identical with their bodies, it need not be main...77%Baker's constitution view of persons opens the way for a doctrine of r...76%Historically, the standard view of the afterlife in the major theistic...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: afterlife
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    Given these difficulties with the re-creation view, attempts have been made to find other ways of accounting for resurrection in materialist terms. One of the more interesting of these is Lynne Rudder Baker’s invocation of a constitution view of persons (Baker 2000, 2001, 2005). On this view persons are not identical with, but are constituted by, their bodies. (She discusses the constitution relation at considerable length; the details of this are not relevant here.) What is distinctive of persons is a “first-person perspective”, roughly, the capacity to think of oneself as oneself. This abili...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit