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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Perspectives
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    42
    The Form of the F cannot be one, contradicting the Onenes... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The Form of the F cannot be one, contradicting the Oneness of Forms.

    Modality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.On the Magnitude Model (Parmenides 131c-e), if the Form is like a magnitude, then F particulars each possess the whole Form, making the Form wholly present in multiple places simultaneously.
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    • 2.Whatever is wholly present as a numerically single entity in multiple spatially distinct locations is not numerically one but is multiply instantiated, violating Platonic Oneness.
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    • 3.The Magnitude Model and the Piece-of-Pie Model are exhaustive of how a Form can be present in particulars, and both entail that the Form is not one.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Proclus and the Neoplatonic tradition held that genuine unity requires self-identity without internal differentiation; anything that grounds distinct relational properties in distinct particulars thereby exhibits internal differentiation.
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    • 2.The Form of the F, as cause of F-ness in numerically distinct particulars A and B, must ground numerically distinct instances of F-ness, introducing real internal differentiation into the Form itself.
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    • 3.A Form that is internally differentiated by its causal relations to distinct particulars cannot satisfy the criterion of strict numerical oneness required by the Theory of Forms.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.By Causality, sensible F things A, B, and C are F by virtue of partaking of the Form of the F.
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    • 2.Under the Piece-of-Pie Model, there is a part of the Form of the F in each of A, B, and C.
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    • 3.To avoid the absurdity of the same part existing as a whole in separate places simultaneously, the part of the Form of the F in A must be numerically distinct from the part in B and the part in C.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    3 topics

    Personal Identity3 linkedCausation1 linkedDivine Attributes1 linked

    Related

    A Form that is internally differentiated by its causal relations to distinct par...By Causality, sensible F things A, B, and C are F by virtue of partaking of the ...If the parts of the Form of the F in A, B, and C are numerically distinct, then ...On the Magnitude Model (Parmenides 131c-e), if the Form is like a magnitude, the...
    +7 moreShow less
    Proclus and the Neoplatonic tradition held that genuine unity requires self-iden...The Form of the F, as cause of F-ness in numerically distinct particulars A and ...

    Similar

    Socrates admits at the end of Parmenides' criticism of the Piece-of-Pi...86%The Form F cannot be one85%ZFC cannot refute the Continuum Hypothesis (CH)79%Therefore C and D must be identical, contradicting the hypothesis that...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: plato-parmenides
    View source passageHide passage
    Having assimilated Socrates’ day analogy to the Piece-of-Pie Model, Parmenides turns to a criticism of this second version of the Pie Model. Suppose, then, the same three sensible F things—A, B, and C—in separate places at the same time. According to Causality, A, B, and C are F by virtue of partaking of the F, and hence A, B, and C partake of the F. Given the Piece-of-Pie Model, there is a part of the F in each of A, B, and C. If the same absurdity generated from the Whole Pie Model is to be av
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    The Magnitude Model and the Piece-of-Pie Model are exhaustive of how a Form can ...
    To avoid the absurdity of the same part existing as a whole in separate places s...
    Under the Piece-of-Pie Model, there is a part of the Form of the F in each of A,...
    What is divided into multiple distinct parts cannot be one.
    Whatever is wholly present as a numerically single entity in multiple spatially ...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit