The general objection against moral naturalism — that an identity between moral properties and natural properties is problematic — applies equally to all prominent theories of moral naturalism, not only Copp's.
David Copp is a contemporary philosopher who developed a specific version of moral naturalism (a theory about how morality connects to the natural world).
identity (in philosophy)(whether the trees are actually identical)
Sameness or whether two things are actually the same thing, not just very similar.
moral naturalism(Moore identifies two forms of moral naturalism, both of which he argues commit the naturalistic fallacy.)
The view that moral properties are identical to, or reducible to, properties specifiable in terms describing the natural world.
moral properties(Disputed between non-cognitivists (who deny or remain silent on their existence) and their critics)
Properties such as badness, goodness, or evil that events or states of affairs may possess, and in virtue of which those events are bad, good, or evil
natural properties(Used to contrast with moral properties in both Kant's and Moore's arguments)
Properties that are known through experience (empirically accessible properties)
The general objection, it should be stressed, is not limited to Copp’s theory. The objection can be put equally forcefully for any of the other prominent theories of moral naturalism. Copp has a rebuttal, however, that would apply generally for the other naturalistic moral theories that entail an identity of the kind under attack. Consider a piece of paper that has the property of being a U.S. dollar bill. To state in the terms of economic theory the truth conditions for a piece of paper having
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