Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The general objection against moral naturalism — that an identity between moral properties and natural properties is problematic — applies equally to all prominent theories of moral naturalism, not only Copp's.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The objection targets any theory that entails an identity between moral properties and natural properties.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.All prominent moral naturalist theories entail such an identity.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Skepticism
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.