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    The identity theory of truth faces an objection based on ... — Carmelics
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    The identity theory of truth faces an objection based on the non-congruence of canonical names of propositions and facts.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Frege's context principle shows that grammatical category differences between 'fact' and 'proposition' expressions reflect surface syntax, not ontological distinctions.
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    • 2.If 'the fact that snow is white' and 'the proposition that snow is white' were truly identical, substitution failures would be impossible—yet they systematically occur across modal and epistemic contexts.
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    • 3.Systematic non-intersubstitutability salva congruitate is a reliable indicator of categorial difference, as Davidson's work on logical form demonstrates.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Vendler's linguistic analysis in 'Res Cogitans' establishes that nominalization patterns for facts and propositions diverge systematically across natural languages, not merely in English.
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    • 2.If the identity theory were correct, the predicate 'is true' and 'obtains' would be co-extensive across all linguistic frames, but their divergent grammatical behavior in embedded contexts falsifies this expectation.
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    • 3.Horwich's minimalism about truth preserves the T-schema while conceding that 'obtains' and 'is true' occupy distinct grammatical roles, undermining the identity theorist's semantic unification.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Canonical names of propositions and of facts are often not intersubstitutable salva congruitate.
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    • 2.Even when such names are intersubstitutable, they may not be intersubstitutable salva veritate.
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    • 3.We say propositions are true but not that they obtain, whereas we say facts obtain but not that they are true.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    Canonical names of propositions and of facts are often not intersubstitutable sa...Even when such names are intersubstitutable, they may not be intersubstitutable ...Frege's context principle shows that grammatical category differences between 'f...Horwich's minimalism about truth preserves the T-schema while conceding that 'ob...
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    If 'the fact that snow is white' and 'the proposition that snow is white' were t...If the identity theory were correct, the predicate 'is true' and 'obtains' would...Systematic non-intersubstitutability salva congruitate is a reliable indicator o...Vendler's linguistic analysis in 'Res Cogitans' establishes that nominalization ...We say propositions are true but not that they obtain, whereas we say facts obta...

    Similar

    The identity theorist may be able to reject the non-congruence objecti...82%On the identity theory, a proposition is true just if it is identical ...80%If identity is necessary, a theory committed to Hesperus is automatica...79%The relation between a true proposition and the corresponding fact is ...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: truth-identity
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    A further objection to the identity theory, going back to an observation of Strawson’s, takes its cue from the point that canonical names of propositions and of facts are often not straightforwardly congruent with one another: they are often not intersubstitutable salva congruitate (or, if they are, they may not be intersubstitutable salva veritate) (Strawson 1971: 196; cf. Künne 2003: 10–12). For example, we say that propositions are true, not that they obtain, whereas we say that facts obtain,
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit