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    The inductive justification of induction has value as a c... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
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    The inductive justification of induction has value as a consistency check on existing beliefs, even if it cannot persuade skeptics or counterinductivists.

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The inductive justification shows that inductive inferences are reliable.
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    • 2.Demonstrating reliability provides added value even when inductive inferences are already accepted as unproblematic.
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    • 3.A consistency check on existing beliefs is epistemically valuable.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.A consistency check that assumes the very principle under scrutiny commits the circular fallacy Hume identified, not merely a benign redundancy.
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    • 2.Epistemic value requires that a check could in principle reveal error; inductive self-validation cannot detect induction's failure without presupposing its success.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Nelson Goodman's new riddle shows induction admits rival, mutually inconsistent extrapolations equally self-consistent, so internal coherence fails to discriminate valid from invalid inductive schemes.
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    • 2.A consistency check that cannot adjudicate between 'green' and 'grue' projections provides no genuine epistemic gain beyond confirming a scheme is closed under its own rules.
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    Related

    A consistency check on existing beliefs is epistemically valuable.A consistency check that assumes the very principle under scrutiny commits the c...A consistency check that cannot adjudicate between 'green' and 'grue' projection...Demonstrating reliability provides added value even when inductive inferences ar...
    +3 moreShow less
    Epistemic value requires that a check could in principle reveal error; inductive...Nelson Goodman's new riddle shows induction admits rival, mutually inconsistent ...The inductive justification shows that inductive inferences are reliable.

    Similar

    All justification for induction and knowledge claims based on inductio...82%The inductive justification shows that inductive inferences are reliab...82%Appealing to an inductive argument to justify induction would be unacc...82%Hume's sceptical question about the justification of induction does no...82%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: induction-problem
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    The response to these concerns is that, as Papineau puts it, the argument is “not supposed to do very much” (Papineau 1992: 18). The fact that a counterinductivist counterpart of the argument exists is true, but irrelevant. It is conceded that the argument cannot persuade either a counterinductivist, or a skeptic. Nonetheless, proponents of the inductive justification maintain that there is still some added value in showing that inductive inferences are reliable, even when we already accept that
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit