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    The inference from phenomenal similarity to shared object... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→We never directly experience material things; every experience has sense-data rather than material things as its objects.

    The inference from phenomenal similarity to shared object-type commits the 'phenomenal fallacy' identified by Smart: confusing properties of experience with properties of what is experienced.

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    Key Terms

    Object-type(as used in metaphysics)
    A category or kind of thing in the world, like 'chairs' or 'dogs' or 'colors'—basically what type of object something is.
    Phenomenal fallacy(as used in philosophy of mind)
    A logical mistake where you assume that because an experience feels a certain way, the thing causing that experience must actually have that quality.
    Phenomenal similarity(as used in philosophy of mind)
    When two experiences feel or appear the same way to a person, even if they might be caused by different things.
    Properties of experience(as used in philosophy of mind)
    The qualities or characteristics of what it's like to have a mental experience—for example, the redness of seeing red, or the painfulness of feeling pain.
    Properties of what is experienced

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    (as used in philosophy of mind)
    The actual qualities that belong to the real object or thing in the world, separate from how it appears in your mind.
    Smart (J.J.C. Smart)(as a philosopher referenced in this statement)
    A 20th-century philosopher famous for arguing that mental states are really just brain states, and for identifying the mistake of confusing how something feels with what it actually is.
    inference(Nyāya epistemology)
    A component of epistemology in Nyāya philosophy; a veritable inference yields knowledge about the world and must have premises that are themselves known

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    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedPerception1 linked

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    We never directly experience material things; every experience has sense-data ra...

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