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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    We never directly experience material things; every exper... — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    We never directly experience material things; every experience has sense-data rather than material things as its objects.

    Consciousness & MindPerception
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Every experience stands in the required introspective indiscriminability relation to some experience that has only sense-data as its objects.
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    • 2.If an experience is introspectively indiscriminable from an experience with only sense-data as objects, then it too has only sense-data as objects.
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    • 3.Sense-data are not material things.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Introspective indiscriminability is not a transitive or constitutive relation: two experiences can be indiscriminable yet have numerically distinct objects.
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    • 2.J.L. Austin demonstrated that 'looks,' 'seems,' and 'appears' locutions do not entail an inner sense-datum object, only a qualified perceptual claim about the world.
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    • 3.The inference from phenomenal similarity to shared object-type commits the 'phenomenal fallacy' identified by Smart: confusing properties of experience with properties of what is experienced.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Gibsonian ecological perception and McDowell's disjunctivism both ground veridical perception in direct causal-relational contact with distal material objects, not mediating sense-data.
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    • 2.If disjunctivism is true, then veridical and hallucinatory experiences are fundamentally different in kind, undermining P1's assumption that all experiences share a common sense-datum object.
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    Topics

    PerceptionConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linked

    Related

    Every experience stands in the required introspective indiscriminability relatio...Gibsonian ecological perception and McDowell's disjunctivism both ground veridic...If an experience is introspectively indiscriminable from an experience with only...If disjunctivism is true, then veridical and hallucinatory experiences are funda...
    +4 moreShow less
    Introspective indiscriminability is not a transitive or constitutive relation: t...J.L. Austin demonstrated that 'looks,' 'seems,' and 'appears' locutions do not e...Sense-data are not material things.The inference from phenomenal similarity to shared object-type commits the 'phen...

    Similar

    Experiencing sense-data is distinct from experiencing material things.88%If one experience has only sense-data as its objects and a second expe...87%If an experience is introspectively indiscriminable from an experience...84%Sense-data are not material things or elements in the environment inde...82%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: austin-jl
    View source passageHide passage
    Central to those considerations are those organized by versions of what is known as the argument from illusion ((6) above).[21] The version of the argument that Austin criticizes can be reconstructed as follows. (i) There are cases of illusion in which we have a sensory experience as of seeing something of some sort with specific features but in which nothing has those specific features. This might be because, although we experience something of the sort in question, the thing we experience la
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit