The inference from 'possible being requires an external cause' to 'there must be a being whose essence is identical to its existence' smuggles in a substantive ontological assumption that possibility and necessity are intrinsic rather than relational properties.
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Possible being(contrasted with things that must exist or definitely don't exist)
Something that could exist but might not—like a unicorn or a future invention.
essence(Medieval realist metaphysics)
The defining nature of a species, held by some to be distinct from and capable of surviving the destruction of all individual members of that species
inference(Nyāya epistemology)
A component of epistemology in Nyāya philosophy; a veritable inference yields knowledge about the world and must have premises that are themselves known
intrinsic properties(Contrasted with structural properties revealed by physics)
Properties which supposedly underlie and account for the structural properties of things.
relational properties(Contrasted with intrinsic properties in the property-dualist two-aspects theory)
Properties of objects that appear to us and are spatial and temporal