The kind of awareness of sensations that involves the application of concepts just is one's knowledge of one's experiences — that is, one's justified, true, unGettiered appearance belief
The ability to notice and pay attention to what you're feeling or experiencing, like being conscious that you're in pain or seeing red.
justified(Epistemological discussion of Socratic wisdom in The Apology)
Having beliefs formed with adequate evidence or through reliable belief-forming processes, distinct from the ability to demonstrate one's justification to an interrogator.
knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.
knowledge of one's experiences(what the statement claims awareness of sensations really is)
Actually understanding and being able to think about what's happening to you, rather than just passively feeling it.
true(Dietrich's account of the interchangeability of being, truth, and goodness)
Perhaps the most important problem for this view concerns the relevant understanding of seemings, or perceptual experience. It is clear that seemings must be non-belief states of some sort, as their epistemological role is to confer justification on basic beliefs, and the latter wouldn’t be basic if seemings were themselves beliefs. The “Sellarsian dilemma” is a famous argument, due perhaps as much to BonJour (1978, 1985) as to Sellars (1956), which claims that “experience” and “seemings” and th