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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The Langton and Lewis account fails as an account of qualitative identity interior properties

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The Langton and Lewis account classifies 'being such that there is a number' as intrinsic
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    • 2.Numbers necessarily exist
      ?

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    • 3.'Being such that there is a number' should not be classified as a qualitative identity interior property
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Langton and Lewis define intrinsic properties as those shared by all duplicates, but modal properties like 'being such that 2+2=4' are shared by all duplicates trivially.
      ?

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    • 2.A property shared by absolutely every possible object fails to discriminate qualitative character, making it unsuitable as an intrinsic property in Lewis's own sense.
      ?

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    • 3.Marshall and Parsons demonstrate that the duplication-based account collapses when applied to necessary truths, generating counterexamples that Lewis's framework cannot resolve.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Yablo's independence criterion requires that intrinsic properties be ones whose instantiation is independent of what accompanies the object, but mathematical existence is not accompaniment-dependent.
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    • 2.If a property holds in every world regardless of an object's nature or relations, it carries no information about qualitative interior character in the sense required by personal identity theory.
      ?

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