Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    The laws governing the will cannot be natural laws. — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Free Will & Foreknowledge
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The laws governing the will cannot be natural laws.

    CausationFree Will & Foreknowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Natural laws govern the movements of the body, the workings of the brain and nervous system, and environmental effects on the agent as a material being.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Having the will governed by such natural laws is inconsistent with the will being free in the negative sense.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Compatibilists like Hume argue that freedom of the will consists in acting from one's own desires and reasons, not in being uncaused.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If the will can be free while determined by one's character and motivational states, then natural laws governing those states need not undermine free will.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Kant's 'negative freedom' presupposes an incompatibilist definition of freedom that is itself a contested philosophical assumption, not a neutral starting point.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Spinoza argues that rational laws governing the will are themselves a species of natural law, expressible within a single unified causal order.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If practical reason and its normative laws supervene on or are identical with natural processes in the brain, the distinction between natural and rational law collapses.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Free Will & ForeknowledgeCausation

    Related

    Compatibilists like Hume argue that freedom of the will consists in acting from ...Having the will governed by such natural laws is inconsistent with the will bein...If practical reason and its normative laws supervene on or are identical with na...If the will can be free while determined by one's character and motivational sta...
    +3 moreShow less
    Kant's 'negative freedom' presupposes an incompatibilist definition of freedom t...Natural laws govern the movements of the body, the workings of the brain and ner...Spinoza argues that rational laws governing the will are themselves a species of...

    Similar

    This law cannot be a natural law (psychological, physical, chemical, o...90%Having the will governed by such natural laws is inconsistent with the...85%A will that operates by being determined through natural laws (such as...81%Therefore, the law governing the will must be one authored by the rati...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: kant-moral
    View source passageHide passage
    Crucially, rational wills that are negatively free must be autonomous, or so Kant argues. This is because the will is a kind of cause—willing causes action. Kant took from Hume the idea that causation implies universal regularities: if x causes y, then there is some universally valid law connecting Xs to Ys. So, if my will is the cause of my φing, then Φing is connected to the sort of willing I engage in by some universal law. But it can’t be a natural law, such as a psychological, physical, che
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit