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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The likelihood ratio of naked statistical evidence is significantly greater than one, undermining the argument that naked statistical evidence has no evidential value.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Under plausible assumptions, the likelihood ratio of naked statistical evidence is significantly greater than one.
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    • 2.If the likelihood ratio is greater than one, the evidence does provide discriminating evidential value.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Bayesian confirmation theory holds that evidence E confirms hypothesis H when P(H|E) > P(H), which is equivalent to a likelihood ratio exceeding one.
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    • 2.Naked statistical evidence, such as knowing 80% of a fleet's buses caused accidents, raises P(guilt|evidence) above the prior, satisfying the Bayesian confirmation threshold.
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    • 3.Therefore, by the logic of Bayesian epistemology as defended by Howson and Urbach, naked statistical evidence meets the formal criterion for genuine evidential support.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.L.J. Cohen's distinction between Pascalian and Baconian probability does not negate that naked statistics carry Pascalian probabilistic weight sufficient to shift posterior beliefs.
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    • 2.Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo's relative plausibility theory acknowledges that statistical base rates legitimately constrain which narrative explanations are plausible.
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    • 3.If statistical evidence constrains the plausibility space of competing hypotheses, it performs a discriminating evidential function that is definitionally incompatible with having no evidential value.
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