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    The Moral Judgment Internalism thesis (MJI) leads to non-... — Carmelics
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    The Moral Judgment Internalism thesis (MJI) leads to non-cognitive expressivism.

    Philosophy of Language
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    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.If moral judgments entail motivation, then moral judgments must be at least partly constituted by conative states.
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    • 2.States that are partly constituted by conative elements rather than purely cognitive beliefs are the subject matter of non-cognitive expressivism.
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    • 3.The neo-Humean view holds that only conative states, not beliefs alone, necessarily motivate.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kant's moral rationalism holds that pure practical reason generates both moral judgment and motivation through the categorical imperative, with no irreducibly conative state required.
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    • 2.The neo-Humean premise that only conative states motivate is a substantive psychological thesis that rationalists like Korsgaard deny on grounds of rational self-constitution.
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    • 3.If the neo-Humean motivational psychology embedded in P3 is false, the inference from MJI to non-cognitive expressivism loses its essential bridge premise.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Cognitivist internalists like John McDowell argue that some beliefs—moral perceptions shaped by virtue—are intrinsically motivating without requiring a separate conative state.
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    • 2.If beliefs themselves can motivate when the agent has the right character, then MJI is compatible with cognitivism and thus does not entail expressivist non-cognitivism.
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

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    Moral Responsibility2 linked

    Related

    Cognitivist internalists like John McDowell argue that some beliefs—moral percep...If beliefs themselves can motivate when the agent has the right character, then ...If moral judgments entail motivation, then moral judgments must be at least part...If the neo-Humean motivational psychology embedded in P3 is false, the inference...
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    Kant's moral rationalism holds that pure practical reason generates both moral j...States that are partly constituted by conative elements rather than purely cogni...The neo-Humean premise that only conative states motivate is a substantive psych...The neo-Humean view holds that only conative states, not beliefs alone, necessar...

    Similar

    States that are partly constituted by conative elements rather than pu...80%The Church-Turing thesis is, in its present form, unprovable.79%Externalists deny even the Counterfactual Motivation Internalist thesi...76%Moral judgments entail motivation (the Moral Judgment Internalism thes...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: normativity-metaethics
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    A different view would invoke the neo-Humean view that no belief (properly so called) entails or necessitates motivation; beliefs motivate only when combined with an appropriately related desire. On this view, if moral judgments entail motivation, then moral judgments are not (ordinary) beliefs, properly so-called. They must instead be at least partly constituted by conative states that do necessarily motivate. In this way, MJI can lead to non-cognitive expressivism.
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    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit