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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The Moral Judgment Internalism thesis (MJI) leads to non-cognitive expressivism.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kant's moral rationalism holds that pure practical reason generates both moral judgment and motivation through the categorical imperative, with no irreducibly conative state required.
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    • 2.The neo-Humean premise that only conative states motivate is a substantive psychological thesis that rationalists like Korsgaard deny on grounds of rational self-constitution.
      ?

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    • 3.If the neo-Humean motivational psychology embedded in P3 is false, the inference from MJI to non-cognitive expressivism loses its essential bridge premise.
      ?

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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Cognitivist internalists like John McDowell argue that some beliefs—moral perceptions shaped by virtue—are intrinsically motivating without requiring a separate conative state.
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    • 2.If beliefs themselves can motivate when the agent has the right character, then MJI is compatible with cognitivism and thus does not entail expressivist non-cognitivism.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If moral judgments entail motivation, then moral judgments must be at least partly constituted by conative states.
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    • 2.States that are partly constituted by conative elements rather than purely cognitive beliefs are the subject matter of non-cognitive expressivism.
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    • 3.The neo-Humean view holds that only conative states, not beliefs alone, necessarily motivate.
      ?

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