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    The motivation for self-deceptive belief formation should... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The motivation for self-deceptive belief formation should be restricted to a desire to believe that p.

    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.The phrase 'unwelcome belief' is ambiguous, since a belief itself can be desirable even if its being true is not.
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    • 2.An agent may want to hold the belief that p (e.g., that the burner was left on) without wanting p to be the case, because holding the belief ensures p will not be true.
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    • 3.Restricting the motivating desire to a desire to believe that p clarifies what twisted and straight self-deception have in common.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Agents often enter self-deception motivated by a desire that p be false (e.g., 'I want it not to be true that I am ill'), not merely a desire to believe p.
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    • 2.Mele's 'straight' self-deception paradigm cases show that the operative desire is typically desire-that-not-p, which then biases evidence-processing without any independent desire to hold the resulting belief.
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    • 3.Restricting motivation to desire-to-believe-p renders the account unable to explain why the self-deceived person's belief tracks the motivationally charged proposition rather than some arbitrary comfortable alternative.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Davidson's account grounds self-deception in akratic-style partition of the mind, where the motivating state is a full propositional attitude toward the world, not a second-order desire about one's own doxastic states.
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    • 2.If the motivating desire were always a desire to believe p, self-deception would require implausibly sophisticated meta-cognitive awareness of one's own belief-formation processes prior to being deceived.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

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    Philosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Agents often enter self-deception motivated by a desire that p be false (e.g., '...An agent may want to hold the belief that p (e.g., that the burner was left on) ...Davidson's account grounds self-deception in akratic-style partition of the mind...If the motivating desire were always a desire to believe p, self-deception would...
    +5 moreShow less
    Mele's 'straight' self-deception paradigm cases show that the operative desire i...Restricting motivation to desire-to-believe-p renders the account unable to expl...Restricting the motivating desire to a desire to believe that p clarifies what t...The phrase 'unwelcome belief' is ambiguous, since a belief itself can be desirab...This restriction also clarifies why other forms of motivated belief formation ar...

    Similar

    Even a desire not to acquire a false belief that p can motivate self-d...89%Unwelcome self-deceptive beliefs can be motivated by fear or jealousy.85%It isn't clear why some intentions to acquire a self-deceptive belief ...85%It is sufficient for self-deceivers to acquire the unwarranted false b...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: self-deception
    View source passageHide passage
    One question philosophers have sought to answer is how a single unified account of self-deception can explain both welcome and unwelcome beliefs. If a unified account is sought, then it seems self-deception cannot require that the self-deceptive belief itself be desired. Pears (1984) has argued that unwelcome belief might be driven by fear or jealousy. My fear of my house burning down might motivate my false belief that I have left the stove burner on. This unwelcome belief serves to ensure that
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit