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    The necessary being cannot be the universe. — Carmelics
    Home/Natural Theology
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The necessary being cannot be the universe.

    Natural Theology
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Being a necessary being cannot be a derivative emergent property, otherwise the being would be contingent.
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    • 2.The connection between the essential properties of a necessary being must be necessary.
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    • 3.The universe is mereologically complex.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Mereological complexity does not preclude necessary existence, as a complex whole can possess modal properties irreducible to its parts.
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    • 2.Spinoza's *Deus sive Natura* demonstrates a coherent tradition in which the universe itself is the one necessary, self-causing substance.
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    • 3.If the universe exists necessarily as a brute modal fact, no derivative emergence is required, undermining P1's scope.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Necessitarian naturalists like Schaffer argue the cosmos is a fundamental, gunky whole from which parts are derived, not vice versa.
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    • 2.If the universe is the fundamental entity and parts are ontologically derivative, the universe's necessity is not emergent but primitive.
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    Topics

    Natural Theology

    Related

    Being a necessary being cannot be a derivative emergent property, otherwise the ...If the universe exists necessarily as a brute modal fact, no derivative emergenc...If the universe is the fundamental entity and parts are ontologically derivative...Mereological complexity does not preclude necessary existence, as a complex whol...
    +4 moreShow less
    Necessitarian naturalists like Schaffer argue the cosmos is a fundamental, gunky...Spinoza's *Deus sive Natura* demonstrates a coherent tradition in which the univ...The connection between the essential properties of a necessary being must be nec...The universe is mereologically complex.

    Similar

    The necessary being is something other than the universe.92%A necessary being exists.83%A necessary being is one in whom possible being is sufficient for actu...83%A necessary being must have its existence either from itself or from a...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted2/3 agreementValid
    SEP: cosmological-argument
    O'Connor 2004
    View source passageHide passage
    Whether 8 and 9 are an intrinsic part of the cosmological argument is debated. Kant argued that the argument had two parts, the first establishing the existence of an absolutely necessary being; the second part, identifying this being as the most real being (1787, B633–40). Without the second part, the concept of a necessary being was empty. The issue achieves significance when the question arises whether the argument has religious significance, that is, whether necessary being to which the argument concludes is God. Some contend that from the concept of a necessary being flow properties appro...
    Extraction notes

    Validity: The passage presents O'Connor's argument that a necessary being cannot have derivative emergent properties and must have necessary connections between essential properties, and that because the universe is mereologically complex, it cannot be the necessary being—which is exactly the extracted argument.

    Confidence: Explicit argument attributed to O'Connor.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit