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    The One cannot be many — Carmelics
    Home/Divine Attributes
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    Supports→The One cannot have parts

    The One cannot be many

    Against an aspect of GodDivine Attributes
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    Divine AttributesAgainst an aspect of God

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    1 linked claim · 1 topic

    Modality & Possibility2 linked
    The One cannot have parts

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    If the One had parts, it would be manyIf the One is, it must be without partsThe One cannot have parts

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    Omniscience is not possible.76%For something to be truly one is for it not to be many in any way74%What is many or has parts cannot be the simple One73%Any thing other than God that is called 'one' is many as well as one73%

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    AI-extracted
    SEP: speusippus
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    The first is an argument from the assumed simplicity of the One. This corresponds to things we can find in Plato. In what is frequently referred to as the ‘first hypothesis’ of Plato’s Parmenides (137c-142a), Parmenides begins (137c) by laying it down that the One cannot be many; he then argues, first (137cd), that if the One is, it must be without parts, since otherwise it would be many. Subsequent argumentation makes this a proscription against all attempts to predicate anything positive of th

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