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    The 'one-off' premise conflates token uniqueness with typ... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Metaphysical explanation cannot be entirely deductive-nomological (covering law) in nature.

    The 'one-off' premise conflates token uniqueness with type-level inexplicability, since D-N models explain token events via type-level laws.

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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.D-N explanation requires subsumption under general laws; token events are particulars explained via universal regularities, not by their uniqueness.
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    • 2.Calling an event 'one-off' describes its token properties, not its explanatory status; laws operate at the type-level regardless of token frequency.
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    • 3.If unique events were inexplicable, we couldn't explain singular historical events like specific volcanic eruptions—yet we demonstrably can via laws.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Type-level laws may be necessary but insufficient for explaining tokens when initial conditions are unknowable or when singular causal histories matter.
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    • 2.The conflation charge assumes D-N models work uniformly; but some one-off events resist law-subsumption precisely because their antecedent conditions are unrepeatable.
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    • 3.Even if laws explain token events, unrepeatable tokens differ metaphysically from repeatable types—this difference may ground distinct explanatory gaps.
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    Calling an event 'one-off' describes its token properties, not its explanatory s...D-N explanation requires subsumption under general laws; token events are partic...Even if laws explain token events, unrepeatable tokens differ metaphysically fro...If unique events were inexplicable, we couldn't explain singular historical even...
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    Metaphysical explanation cannot be entirely deductive-nomological (covering law)...The conflation charge assumes D-N models work uniformly; but some one-off events...Type-level laws may be necessary but insufficient for explaining tokens when ini...

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