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    The positive existential statement that there is a cat is... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The lack of informativeness is not a good objection to the optimalist account of negative truths

    The positive existential statement that there is a cat is true because there is a cat

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    So non-informativeness by itself is not a defect in such accountsThe lack of informativeness is not a good objection to the optimalist account of...This is no explanation at all, yet it is none the worse for that

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    Despite their differences, optimalism and (Truth Supervenes Upon Being) share a key idea in common—that a negative existential truth isn’t true because something exists, but because something doesn’t, viz. a truth-maker for its contradictory, a false-maker for it. C.B. Martin has objected that this doesn’t obviate the need to posit truth-makers for negative existentials. This is because a statement that there are no false-makers for a negative existential truth is itself a negative existential t

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