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    Made withinDC&Austin
    The lack of informativeness is not a good objection to th... — Carmelics
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    Home/Truth & Knowledge
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The lack of informativeness is not a good objection to the optimalist account of negative truths

    Truth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The positive existential statement that there is a cat is true because there is a cat
      ?

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    • 2.This is no explanation at all, yet it is none the worse for that
      ?

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    • 3.So non-informativeness by itself is not a defect in such accounts
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Positive existential truths have clear ontological grounds (the cat itself), making non-informativeness a tolerable feature of a genuinely grounded account.
      ?

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    • 2.Negative truths under optimalism lack any analogous ontological ground, so non-informativeness here signals the absence of a truthmaker rather than its presence.
      ?

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    • 3.The disanalogy between positive and negative cases means the cat-example fails to discharge the explanatory burden optimalism faces with absences.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Armstrong and Lewis require truthmaker accounts to satisfy the Entailment Principle: truthmakers must necessitate the truths they ground.
      ?

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    • 2.Optimalism appeals to the totality of what exists, but this appeal is itself uninformative precisely because it cannot specify which feature of reality necessitates any particular negative truth.
      ?

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    • 3.An account that cannot specify the necessitating ground for each negative truth fails the Entailment Principle, not merely an aesthetic demand for informativeness.
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    Topics

    Truth & Knowledge

    Notable Defenders

    Arthur Priorcontemporary
    Barry SmithcontemporaryMulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 313
    Barry Smithcontemporary
    Barry SmithcontemporaryMulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 316
    Barry SmithcontemporaryMulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 314
    Benjamin SchniedercontemporarySchnieder 2006a: 29–37
    Benjamin Schniedercontemporary
    Bertrand RussellcontemporaryRussell
    Bertrand RussellcontemporaryRussell 1918–19: 209–11
    C.B. Martincontemporary
    C.B. MartincontemporaryMartin 1996: 58–9, 65–6
    Cameroncontemporary2008b
    D. M. ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 2004: 54–5
    D. M. ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 2004: 62–3
    D. M. ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1997: 115
    D. M. ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1997: 116; 2004: 7
    D. M. ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1989: 94; Armstrong 2004: 75
    D. M. ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1973: 11
    D. M. Armstrongcontemporary
    D.M. ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1989b: 8–11, 2004: 1–3
    D.M. ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 2004: 64–7
    Dalycontemporary2000: 97–8
    David ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 2004: 73
    David ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1989b: 24–5
    David Armstrongcontemporary
    David Armstrongcontemporary
    David Armstrongcontemporary
    David ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 2004: 55
    David Armstrongcontemporary
    David ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1997: 131
    David Lewiscontemporary
    David LewiscontemporaryLewis 1998: 220; Lewis 2001: 611; Lewis 1986: 73–4
    David LewiscontemporaryLewis 2001: 612
    David Lewiscontemporary
    David LewiscontemporaryLewis 1968; Lewis 2003: 27
    David LewiscontemporaryLewis 2003: 27–32
    David Lewiscontemporary
    David Lewiscontemporary
    David LewiscontemporaryLewis & Rosen (2003)
    David LewiscontemporaryLewis 2004
    David LigginscontemporaryLiggins (2012)
    David LigginscontemporaryLiggins (2012)
    David Malet ArmstrongcontemporaryArmstrong 1997: 128
    Doddcontemporary2007: 385
    E. J. LowecontemporaryLowe 2006: 203–10, 2009: 209–15
    E. J. LowecontemporaryLowe 2006: 185
    E. J. LowecontemporaryLowe 2006: 207; Lowe 2009: 178–80
    Fraser MacBridecontemporaryMacBride 2011: 169
    Fraser MacBridecontemporaryMacBride 2005: 130–2
    Fraser MacBridecontemporaryMacBride (2014)
    Fraser MacBridecontemporaryMacBride 2005: 134–6
    Fraser MacBridecontemporaryMacBride 2013a
    George MolnarcontemporaryMolnar 2000: 81–2
    George MolnarcontemporaryMolnar 2000: 74–5
    George MolnarcontemporaryMolnar 2000: 77
    George MolnarcontemporaryMolnar 2000: 77–80
    Gideon RosencontemporaryLewis & Rosen (2003)
    Gilbert Rylecontemporary
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-PereyracontemporaryRodriguez-Pereyra 2015
    Greg RestallcontemporaryRestall 1996: 333–4
    GregorycontemporaryGregory 2001
    GriffithcontemporaryGriffith 2013
    Helen BeebeecontemporaryBeebee & Dodd 2005b
    Helen BeebeecontemporaryBeebee 2004
    Herbert HochbergcontemporaryHochberg 1969: 330–1
    Herbert HochbergcontemporaryHochberg 1969: 325–7
    Hoffmancontemporary2006
    Jennifer HornsbycontemporaryHornsby 2005: 35–7
    Jennifer HornsbycontemporaryHornsby 2005: 44
    John Bigelowcontemporary
    John Bigelowcontemporary
    John HeilcontemporaryHeil 2000: 236–240; 2003: 68–72; 2006: 238–40
    John HeilcontemporaryHeil 2003: 9, 2009: 316–7
    John HeilcontemporaryHeil 2000: 233–4; 2003: 62–5
    Jonathan SchaffercontemporarySchaffer 2009: 376
    Joseph MeliacontemporaryMelia 2005: 78–9
    Joseph MeliacontemporaryMelia 2005: 74–5
    Julian DoddcontemporaryDodd 2007: 389
    Julian DoddcontemporaryDodd 2007: 387
    Julian DoddcontemporaryDodd 2007: 388
    Julian DoddcontemporaryBeebee & Dodd 2005b
    Julian DoddcontemporaryDodd 2007: 399–400
    Kevin MulligancontemporaryMulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 313
    Kevin Mulligancontemporary
    Kevin MulligancontemporaryMulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 316
    Kevin MulligancontemporaryMulligan 2007
    Kevin MulligancontemporaryMulligan 2003: 547, 2006: 39, 2007
    Kevin MulligancontemporaryMulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 314
    Kevin MulligancontemporaryMulligan et al. (1984: 288)
    Kit Finecontemporary
    Künnecontemporary
    Künnecontemporary2003: 154–5
    MacBridecontemporary2005: 123–7, 126–7
    Marian DavidcontemporaryDavid 2009: 144
    Milnecontemporary
    Milnecontemporary
    Noël SaenzcontemporarySaenz (2018)
    Paul HorwichcontemporaryHorwich 2009: 195–7
    Paul HorwichcontemporaryHorwich 2009: 188
    Peter SchultecontemporarySchulte 2011a, 2011b
    Peter SimonscontemporarySimons 1992: 161–3
    Peter Simonscontemporary
    Peter SimonscontemporaryMulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 316
    Peter SimonscontemporarySimons 2010: 200
    Peter SimonscontemporarySimons 2008; Mulligan, Simons, & Smith 1984: 314
    Phillip BrickercontemporaryBricker 2006
    Phillip BrickercontemporaryBricker 2015: 179–80
    Phillip BrickercontemporaryBricker 2015: 180–3
    Reinhardt GrossmanncontemporaryGrossman 1992: 130–1
    Richard TaylorcontemporaryTaylor 1952: 438–40, 447
    Richard TaylorcontemporaryTaylor 1952: 443–5
    Rodriguez-Pereyracontemporary2006b: 193
    SaenzcontemporarySaenz 2018
    Schniedercontemporary2006a: 36–7
    Simonscontemporary
    Smithcontemporary
    SmithcontemporarySmith 1999: 10
    SmithcontemporarySmith 1999: 7
    Theodore SidercontemporarySider 2001: 40–1
    Trenton MerrickscontemporaryMerricks 2007: 39–67
    Trenton MerrickscontemporaryMerricks 2007: 12–13
    Trenton MerrickscontemporaryMerricks 2007: 15
    Trenton MerrickscontemporaryMerricks 2007: 2–3
    Wolfgang KünnecontemporaryKünne 2003: 150–6
    Alexius Meinongmodern
    Bertrand RussellmodernReferenced as originator of logical atomism, of which maximalism is described as intellectual heir
    Bertrand RussellmodernRussell 1918–9: 213–5, 1919: 287–9
    Bertrand RussellmodernRussell 1918–19, logical atomism admitting some logically complex facts
    David Humemodern
    Ludwig WittgensteinmodernReferenced as originator of the doctrine that only atomic propositions represent the existence of states of affairs
    Ludwig WittgensteinmodernWittgenstein 1921, version of logical atomism admitting only atomic facts
    Malebranchemodern
    Raphael DemosmodernDemos 1917

    Connections

    1 topic

    Philosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    An account that cannot specify the necessitating ground for each negative truth ...Armstrong and Lewis require truthmaker accounts to satisfy the Entailment Princi...Negative truths under optimalism lack any analogous ontological ground, so non-i...Optimalism appeals to the totality of what exists, but this appeal is itself uni...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: truthmakers
    View source passageHide passage
    Despite their differences, optimalism and (Truth Supervenes Upon Being) share a key idea in common—that a negative existential truth isn’t true because something exists, but because something doesn’t, viz. a truth-maker for its contradictory, a false-maker for it. C.B. Martin has objected that this doesn’t obviate the need to posit truth-makers for negative existentials. This is because a statement that there are no false-makers for a negative existential truth is itself a negative existential t
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    +5 moreShow less
    Positive existential truths have clear ontological grounds (the cat itself), mak...So non-informativeness by itself is not a defect in such accountsThe disanalogy between positive and negative cases means the cat-example fails t...The positive existential statement that there is a cat is true because there is ...This is no explanation at all, yet it is none the worse for that
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit