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    The practical intellect and the will are not separate powers — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    The practical intellect and the will are not separate powers

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.There is only one motive power underlying both sensory desire and intellectual desire
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    • 2.No real distinction exists among motive powers
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The practical intellect presents objects as good or bad, while the will responds to that presentation as a distinct appetitive act.
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    • 2.Aquinas distinguishes intellectus practicus from voluntas precisely because cognition and appetition are irreducibly different modes of operation.
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    • 3.A single power cannot simultaneously be the formal cause of rational judgment and the efficient cause of voluntary motion toward a presented good.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Philip Chancellor's own account of synderesis requires a separate volitional capacity to explain why moral knowledge does not automatically produce moral action.
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    • 2.The phenomenon of akrasia—acting against one's better judgment—is only explicable if the intellective and appetitive functions are genuinely distinct powers.
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    Consciousness & Mind

    Related

    A single power cannot simultaneously be the formal cause of rational judgment an...Aquinas distinguishes intellectus practicus from voluntas precisely because cogn...No real distinction exists among motive powersPhilip Chancellor's own account of synderesis requires a separate volitional cap...
    +3 moreShow less
    The phenomenon of akrasia—acting against one's better judgment—is only explicabl...The practical intellect presents objects as good or bad, while the will responds...There is only one motive power underlying both sensory desire and intellectual d...

    Similar

    The practical intellect and the will are not separate powers, but one ...97%The intellect and the will have different ends: the intellect aims at ...82%The speculative intellect, practical intellect, imagination, and senso...80%The human intellect requires an active intellect (always in act, never...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: philip-chancellor
    View source passageHide passage
    Although Philip denies that the practical intellect and the will are separate powers, he argues for a distinction among the various apprehensive powers (McCluskey 2001). Thus, he sees a genuine distinction between the speculative intellect, the practical intellect, imagination, and the sensory apprehensive powers. This is because what is apprehended by each of these powers is different in nature. Philip denies that any such distinction is present among motive powers. Insofar as the appetite is m
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit