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    The predicate 'good' does not mean the same as any natura... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    The predicate 'good' does not mean the same as any naturalistic predicate X

    Philosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Russell accepts premise (1) of the Open Question Argument
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    • 2.Russell accepts premise (2) of the Open Question Argument
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    • 3.None of the naturalistic predicates suggested so far are synonymous with 'good'
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.The Open Question Argument commits a use-mention fallacy: conceptual non-obviousness does not entail semantic non-identity.
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    • 2.Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical despite 'Is Hesperus Phosphorus?' being genuinely open prior to discovery.
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    • 3.Therefore, 'Is X good?' remaining open is compatible with 'good' being analytically identical to a naturalistic predicate unknown to speakers.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Cornell Realism (Sturgeon, Boyd) holds that 'good' picks out a natural property via a non-analytic, a posteriori reference relation.
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    • 2.If natural kind terms like 'water' refer to H₂O without synonymy, 'good' can refer to a naturalistic property without definitional equivalence.
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    • 3.The claim conflates semantic synonymy with metaphysical co-extensionality, and ruling out the latter requires more than Moore's or Russell's conceptual analysis.
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    Related

    Cornell Realism (Sturgeon, Boyd) holds that 'good' picks out a natural property ...Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical despite 'Is Hesperus Phosphorus?' being ge...If natural kind terms like 'water' refer to H₂O without synonymy, 'good' can ref...None of the naturalistic predicates suggested so far are synonymous with 'good'
    +5 moreShow less
    Russell accepts premise (1) of the Open Question ArgumentRussell accepts premise (2) of the Open Question ArgumentThe Open Question Argument commits a use-mention fallacy: conceptual non-obvious...The claim conflates semantic synonymy with metaphysical co-extensionality, and r...Therefore, 'Is X good?' remaining open is compatible with 'good' being analytica...

    Similar

    None of the naturalistic predicates suggested so far are synonymous wi...92%No naturalistic definition of 'good' is correct90%There is no property of goodness corresponding to the linguistic predi...86%Therefore 'good' stands for a property distinct from any naturalistic ...86%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: russell-moral
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    This brings us back to the Open Question Argument. So far as I can see, Russell continued to accept premises (1) and (2) and thus—with reservations—sub-conclusion (4). “Good” does not mean that same as any naturalistic predicate X—at least, it does not mean the same as any of the naturalistic predicates that have been suggested so far. But he also accepts something like premise (3), that the meaning of a predicate is the property for which it stands. It was because he believed that some predicat
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit