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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The Principle of Noncontradiction applies to all contingent truths as well as all necessary truths.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Dialetheists like Graham Priest argue that some true contradictions exist, making PNC a revisable logical norm rather than an absolute constraint.
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    • 2.If PNC is revisable even for necessary truths, its application to contingent truths cannot be stronger or more universal than its already-contested necessary domain.
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    • 3.A principle that admits exceptions at the necessary level cannot coherently claim unrestricted governance over the contingent level.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Leibniz himself distinguished PNC as governing necessary truths and PSR as the distinct principle required to govern contingent truths.
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    • 2.If contingent truths required only PNC for their governance, Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason would be explanatorily redundant for the contingent domain.
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    • 3.The historical architecture of rationalist modal epistemology presupposes that PNC alone is insufficient to determine which contingent truths obtain.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.There are no contradictory contingent facts or truths.
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    • 2.If there are no contradictory contingent facts, then the Principle of Noncontradiction governs contingent truths just as it governs necessary truths.
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