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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The psychological-continuity view generates a logical contradiction regarding the properties of the original person.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.If the original person is identical to Lefty, and Lefty is hungry at time T, then the original person is hungry at T.
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    • 2.If the original person is identical to Righty, and Righty is not hungry at time T, then the original person is not hungry at T.
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    • 3.The psychological-continuity view entails the original person is both Lefty and Righty.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Leibniz's Law applies strictly only to numerically identical objects sharing all properties across the same possible world and time.
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    • 2.In fission cases, the pre-fission person and each successor exist in diverging continuant streams, not as co-located objects at a single world-time.
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    • 3.When psychological continuity branches, the identity relation itself becomes indeterminate, generating genuine contradictions rather than merely apparent ones, as Parfit argues in Reasons and Persons.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Chisholm's strict identity requires a determinate fact of the matter about which successor is numerically identical to the original, but psychological-continuity views explicitly deny this determinacy.
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    • 2.If psychological continuity is both sufficient for identity and multiply realizable simultaneously, the view entails that one entity instantiates contradictory first-person properties, violating the indiscernibility of identicals.
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    • 3.Sydney Shoemaker's own acknowledgment that branching cases produce 'problem cases' for the psychological view concedes the contradiction rather than resolving it.
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