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    The psychological-continuity view generates a logical con... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The psychological-continuity view generates a logical contradiction regarding the properties of the original person.

    Personal Identity
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    1 reason against

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Leibniz's Law applies strictly only to numerically identical objects sharing all properties across the same possible world and time.
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    • 2.In fission cases, the pre-fission person and each successor exist in diverging continuant streams, not as co-located objects at a single world-time.
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    • 3.When psychological continuity branches, the identity relation itself becomes indeterminate, generating genuine contradictions rather than merely apparent ones, as Parfit argues in Reasons and Persons.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Chisholm's strict identity requires a determinate fact of the matter about which successor is numerically identical to the original, but psychological-continuity views explicitly deny this determinacy.
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    • 2.If psychological continuity is both sufficient for identity and multiply realizable simultaneously, the view entails that one entity instantiates contradictory first-person properties, violating the indiscernibility of identicals.
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    • 3.Sydney Shoemaker's own acknowledgment that branching cases produce 'problem cases' for the psychological view concedes the contradiction rather than resolving it.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.If the original person is identical to Lefty, and Lefty is hungry at time T, then the original person is hungry at T.
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    • 2.If the original person is identical to Righty, and Righty is not hungry at time T, then the original person is not hungry at T.
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    • 3.The psychological-continuity view entails the original person is both Lefty and Righty.
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    Topics

    Personal Identity

    Related

    Chisholm's strict identity requires a determinate fact of the matter about which...If psychological continuity is both sufficient for identity and multiply realiza...If the original person is identical to Lefty, and Lefty is hungry at time T, the...If the original person is identical to Righty, and Righty is not hungry at time ...
    +6 moreShow less
    In fission cases, the pre-fission person and each successor exist in diverging c...Leibniz's Law applies strictly only to numerically identical objects sharing all...Sydney Shoemaker's own acknowledgment that branching cases produce 'problem case...The psychological-continuity view entails the original person is both Lefty and ...Therefore the original person is both hungry and not hungry at T, which is a str...When psychological continuity branches, the identity relation itself becomes ind...

    Similar

    The psychological-continuity view entails the original person is both ...91%The psychological-continuity view implies that any future being psycho...89%The psychological-continuity view, as standardly stated, is false or i...88%If psychological continuity is the basis of personal identity (Parfit'...87%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: identity-personal
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    But now suppose that both hemispheres are transplanted, each into a different empty head. (We needn’t pretend that the hemispheres are exactly alike.) The two recipients—call them Lefty and Righty—will each be psychologically continuous with you. The psychological-continuity view as we have stated it implies that any future being who is psychologically continuous with you must be you. It follows that you are Lefty and also that you are Righty. But that cannot be: if you and Lefty are one and you
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit