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    The referent of a theoretical term like 'atom' is real at... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Supports→We must distinguish between the radical empiricist's meaning of 'meaning' (epistemic reduction) and a more common-sensical meaning of 'meaning' (factual reference).

    The referent of a theoretical term like 'atom' is real atoms, not logical constructions out of sense data.

    PerceptionPhilosophy of Language
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    Philosophy of LanguagePerception

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    Theoretical terms carry an untranslatable surplus meaning beyond observational c...Theoretical terms refer to unobservable, mind-independent entities.We must distinguish between the radical empiricist's meaning of 'meaning' (epist...

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    However, Feigl’s mature conception of a synthesis of scientific realism and logical empiricism is to be found in his 1950 article “Existential Hypotheses” (published in Philosophy of Science). There, it was semantics which served as the vehicle for Feigl’s promotion of the realist project. By ‘semantics,’ Feigl meant (in a nutshell) the formal scrutiny of reference and truth (see Feigl 1950a, p. 36). As such, it had nothing to do with the concrete methods of testing hypotheses. Rather, “semantic

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