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    We must distinguish between the radical empiricist's mean... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    We must distinguish between the radical empiricist's meaning of 'meaning' (epistemic reduction) and a more common-sensical meaning of 'meaning' (factual reference).

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Theoretical terms refer to unobservable, mind-independent entities.
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    • 2.The referent of a theoretical term like 'atom' is real atoms, not logical constructions out of sense data.
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    • 3.Theoretical terms carry an untranslatable surplus meaning beyond observational content.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Carnap's internal/external questions distinction shows 'factual reference' only gains meaning within an adopted linguistic framework.
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    • 2.The 'common-sensical' notion of reference Feigl invokes presupposes a framework-relative ontology, collapsing the distinction he draws.
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    • 3.Without a neutral metalanguage, the contrast between epistemic reduction and factual reference is itself framework-dependent, not foundational.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Quine's indeterminacy of reference thesis demonstrates that no term—observational or theoretical—has a uniquely determinate referent independent of translation schemes.
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    • 2.If reference is irreducibly indeterminate, Feigl's 'surplus meaning' of theoretical terms cannot be grounded in a stable factual reference relation distinct from epistemic content.
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Notable Defenders

    A.J. Ayercontemporaryreferenced as contrast case
    Alfred Tarskicontemporary
    Carl Gustav HempelcontemporaryHempel 1950b, p. 173
    Carl HempelcontemporaryHempel 1935; 1945; 1950a
    Christian KellerwesselcontemporaryKellerwessel 2010
    D.M. Armstrongcontemporary
    Edgar ZilselcontemporaryDas Anwendungsproblem (1916)
    Edgar Zilselcontemporary
    Eino Kailacontemporary
    Ernest NagelcontemporaryNagel 1950, p. 179
    Feiglcontemporary
    Hans ReichenbachcontemporaryCriticized by Feigl regarding the probabilistic solution to induction
    Hans Reichenbachcontemporary
    Hans ReichenbachcontemporaryFeigl 1981, p. 80
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1954, 'Scientific Method without Metaphysical Presuppositions'
    Herbert Feiglcontemporary
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1981
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1981, pp. 417-420
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryDoctoral dissertation under Schlick, July 1927; Feigl 1981, p. 6
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1956, p. 22
    Herbert Feiglcontemporary
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1981
    Herbert Feiglcontemporary
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1936; Feigl 1949
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1950a, pp. 49–50; 1981, pp. 254–255
    Herbert Feiglcontemporary
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl, first publication on the mind-body problem, 1934
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1967; Feigl 1981
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1967, p. 94; Feigl 1981, pp. 346–347; "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'"
    Herbert Feiglcontemporary
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1950a, p. 49; Feigl 1950b, p. 191; Feigl 1981, p. 43
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1981
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1981, pp. 39, 80
    Herbert FeiglcontemporaryFeigl 1981, pp. 14, 256–260, 385
    J.J.C. Smartcontemporary
    Jaegwon KimcontemporaryKim 1998, pp. 1–2
    Karl Poppercontemporary
    Leopold StubenbergcontemporaryStubenberg 1997
    Michael HeidelbergercontemporaryHeidelberger 2003, p. 234
    Moritz SchlickcontemporarySupervisor of Feigl's dissertation; shared view on induction as pragmatic maxim
    Moritz Schlickcontemporary
    Moritz Schlickcontemporaryearly critical realism, later abandoned
    Philipp FrankcontemporaryFrank 1950, p. 167
    Roy W. SellarscontemporaryFeigl 1981, p. 39
    Rudolf CarnapcontemporaryCarnap 1936/37
    Rudolf CarnapcontemporaryCarnap, 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (1950)
    Rudolf Carnapcontemporarythe later Carnap
    Schlickcontemporary
    Stathis PsilloscontemporaryPsillos 1999, p. 12
    Thomas UebelcontemporaryUebel 2007; Uebel 2013
    U.T. Placecontemporary
    Wilfrid Sellarscontemporaryreferenced via Feigl's adoption of his 'pure pragmatics'
    Wilfrid SellarscontemporaryFeigl 1981, p. 39
    Alois RiehlmodernRiehl 1879, 1881, 1887
    David HumemodernReferenced via 'pragmatic (Humean) lines' of argument
    David Humemodern
    Gottlob Fregemodern
    Immanuel Kantmodern
    Moritz SchlickmodernSchlick 1918; 1925; 1974

    Connections

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    Related

    Carnap's internal/external questions distinction shows 'factual reference' only ...If reference is irreducibly indeterminate, Feigl's 'surplus meaning' of theoreti...Quine's indeterminacy of reference thesis demonstrates that no term—observationa...The 'common-sensical' notion of reference Feigl invokes presupposes a framework-...

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    However, Feigl’s mature conception of a synthesis of scientific realism and logical empiricism is to be found in his 1950 article “Existential Hypotheses” (published in Philosophy of Science). There, it was semantics which served as the vehicle for Feigl’s promotion of the realist project. By ‘semantics,’ Feigl meant (in a nutshell) the formal scrutiny of reference and truth (see Feigl 1950a, p. 36). As such, it had nothing to do with the concrete methods of testing hypotheses. Rather, “semantic
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    The referent of a theoretical term like 'atom' is real atoms, not logical constr...Theoretical terms carry an untranslatable surplus meaning beyond observational c...Theoretical terms refer to unobservable, mind-independent entities.Without a neutral metalanguage, the contrast between epistemic reduction and fac...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit