- Avicenna
- Avicenna was a Persian philosopher and physician from around 1000 CE who became one of the most influential thinkers in history. He wrote extensively about logic, medicine, and metaphysics (the nature of reality), bridging Islamic and European thought during the Middle Ages. His medical encyclopedia was so respected that it remained the standard textbook in European universities for hundreds of years, and his philosophical ideas shaped how scholars in both the Islamic world and Europe understood knowledge and existence.
- Duns Scotus(as a historical figure mentioned in the statement)
- A Scottish Scholastic philosopher from the 13th-14th century who was famous for his very detailed logical arguments and his emphasis on the power of individual will.
- Maximally common(as describing the nature of transcendentals)
- Shared by the widest possible range of things; applying to everything without exception, rather than just some things.
- Scholastic tradition(as a philosophical school of thought)
- A style of medieval philosophy that emphasized logical reasoning, careful distinctions, and reconciling different texts and ideas—especially popular in universities and churches during the Middle Ages.
- Transcendental status(as the main point of debate in the statement)
- The position or rank of being a property that applies to everything and is fundamental to all existence, rather than being limited to certain categories of things.
- accidental(describing kinematic motion as non-essential)
- In philosophy, a property that something can gain or lose without changing what it fundamentally is (unlike essential properties that define the thing itself).
- constitutive(an alternative type of relationship the grounding relation might be)
- Describes how something is made up of or formed from basic components that define its essential nature.
- transcendentals(Philip the Chancellor's argument for the unity of intellect and will)
- Metaphysical properties (such as the true and the good) that are co-extensive across all being, differing only intensionally (in concept) but not extensionally (in reference)