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    The skeptic cannot require that in order for S to know so... — Carmelics
    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The skeptic cannot require that in order for S to know something, if it were false S would not still believe it, because this requirement is too strong

    Skepticism
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Safety-based accounts (Sosa, Pritchard) require only that S not believe falsely in nearby possible worlds, not all conceivable ones.
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    • 2.Skeptical scenarios like BIV worlds are modally remote, so beliefs formed reliably in the actual world satisfy the safety condition.
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    • 3.A condition that fails to distinguish between remote and proximate possibilities cannot serve as a plausible epistemic norm.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Williamson's knowledge-first epistemology holds that knowledge is a primitive state not reducible to sensitivity or tracking conditions.
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    • 2.If knowledge is the norm of assertion and belief, then imposing sensitivity as a necessary condition misidentifies the structure of epistemic normativity.
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    • 3.The skeptic's use of sensitivity presupposes a reductive analysis of knowledge that is independently contested by non-reductive accounts.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Nozick's tracking account of knowledge imposes a sensitivity requirement: if x were false, S would not believe x
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    • 2.This sensitivity requirement is arguably too strong as a general condition on knowledge or justification
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    • 3.The mere fact that there could be skeptical scenarios in which S still believes she is not in such a scenario does not entail that she fails to know she is not actually in one
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    Skepticism

    Related

    A condition that fails to distinguish between remote and proximate possibilities...If knowledge is the norm of assertion and belief, then imposing sensitivity as a...Nozick's tracking account of knowledge imposes a sensitivity requirement: if x w...Safety-based accounts (Sosa, Pritchard) require only that S not believe falsely ...
    +5 moreShow less
    Skeptical scenarios like BIV worlds are modally remote, so beliefs formed reliab...The mere fact that there could be skeptical scenarios in which S still believes ...The skeptic's use of sensitivity presupposes a reductive analysis of knowledge t...This sensitivity requirement is arguably too strong as a general condition on kn...Williamson's knowledge-first epistemology holds that knowledge is a primitive st...

    Similar

    The skeptic must accept certain beliefs in order to think or utter any...85%If the skeptic has a false belief about the content of his first-order...84%A skeptic can undermine all common beliefs by identifying a single hyp...82%Therefore, the skeptic's doubt cannot be intelligibly stated or expres...82%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: skepticism
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    CP2 claims that we are not justified in denying the skeptical hypothesis—in other words, that we are not justified in believing that we are not being deceived. What arguments can be given for CP2? It is tempting to suggest something like this: The skeptical scenarios are developed in such a way that it is assumed that we could not tell that we were being deceived. For example, we are asked to consider that there is an Evil Genius “so powerful” that it could (1) make me believe that there were ha
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit