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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The skeptic cannot require that in order for S to know something, if it were false S would not still believe it, because this requirement is too strong

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Nozick's tracking account of knowledge imposes a sensitivity requirement: if x were false, S would not believe x
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.This sensitivity requirement is arguably too strong as a general condition on knowledge or justification
      ?

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    • 3.The mere fact that there could be skeptical scenarios in which S still believes she is not in such a scenario does not entail that she fails to know she is not actually in one
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Safety-based accounts (Sosa, Pritchard) require only that S not believe falsely in nearby possible worlds, not all conceivable ones.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Skeptical scenarios like BIV worlds are modally remote, so beliefs formed reliably in the actual world satisfy the safety condition.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A condition that fails to distinguish between remote and proximate possibilities cannot serve as a plausible epistemic norm.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Williamson's knowledge-first epistemology holds that knowledge is a primitive state not reducible to sensitivity or tracking conditions.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If knowledge is the norm of assertion and belief, then imposing sensitivity as a necessary condition misidentifies the structure of epistemic normativity.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The skeptic's use of sensitivity presupposes a reductive analysis of knowledge that is independently contested by non-reductive accounts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.