The supporting argument's counterexample tacitly restricts the B-base to local intrinsic properties, but global supervenience is defined over total world-histories including all relational and structural properties.

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1 reason for

1 reason against

Reasons For

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Reason for

1.Counterexamples typically isolate minimal cases; restricting to local properties makes them tractable for philosophical analysis.
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2.Global supervenience's definitional scope includes relational properties that local counterexamples may deliberately exclude.
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3.The critique reveals a genuine mismatch between the scope of the proposed base and the scope of the supervenience claim being tested.
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Reasons Against

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Reason against

1.If global supervenience requires including relational properties, the burden shifts to clarifying which relations actually matter.
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2.Counterexamples needn't cover every property type to be valid; they only need to show distinct worlds with identical local bases.
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3.Dismissing counterexamples as 'tacit' restrictions avoids engaging whether the original argument's logic is actually sound.
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Key Terms

B-base(metaphysics of time): In philosophy of time, the collection of all basic facts about the world that don't depend on whether something is happening 'now'—basically, a complete description of reality without any special focus on the present moment.
World-histories(as used in metaphysics and philosophy of time): Complete descriptions of everything that exists and happens in a possible world from beginning to end.
counterexample([IHT] arg. 2): A possible obligational situation (casus possibilis positus) that verifies the antecedent and falsifies the consequent of an inference
global supervenience(Modal supervenience relations in philosophy of mind and metaphysics): A globally supervenes on B if and only if no two possible worlds share the same global pattern of distribution of B-properties while differing in their global pattern of distribution of A-properties.
intrinsic properties(Contrasted with structural properties revealed by physics): Properties which supposedly underlie and account for the structural properties of things.
relational properties(Contrasted with intrinsic properties in the property-dualist two-aspects theory): Properties of objects that appear to us and are spatial and temporal
structural properties(Maxwell's distinction used to rebut Kripke's challenge to the mind-brain identity theory): Properties of brain events that are revealed by common sense, physics, and neurophysiology, as opposed to underlying non-structural (qualitative/phenomenal) properties
supervenience(Philosophy of mind and reduction; contrasted with full reduction): A relation in which mental (or higher-level) states are dependent on physiological (or lower-level) states such that any two cases with identical lower-level bases are identical in their higher-level states; a necessary but not sufficient condition for reduction.

Connections

2 topics

Truth & Knowledge1 linked Modality & Possibility1 linked

Counterexamples needn't cover every property type to be valid; they only need to...Counterexamples typically isolate minimal cases; restricting to local properties...

Details

Type: claim
Perspectives: 2 (1 for, 1 against)
Edits: 1 edit