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    Global supervenience and strong individual supervenience ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Global supervenience and strong individual supervenience are not equivalent concepts.

    Modality & Possibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Strong individual supervenience of A on B requires that any two possible worlds with B-indiscernible individuals must also be A-indiscernible.
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    • 2.There exist possible worlds w1 and w2 where individual x in w1 is B-indiscernible from individual x* in w2 yet A-discernible from x* in w2, violating strong individual supervenience.
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    • 3.Global supervenience of A on B requires only that worlds with the same global distribution of B-properties have the same global distribution of A-properties.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Global supervenience entails strong individual supervenience when combined with the assumption that possible worlds are individuated solely by their intrinsic qualitative character.
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    • 2.If worlds are purely qualitative constructs with no primitive thisness, then indiscernible individuals across worlds collapse into identity, dissolving the asymmetry the supporting argument requires.
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    • 3.Haecceitism—the doctrine that grounds the purported counterexamples—is itself a contentious metaphysical posit, not a neutral logical datum, making the non-equivalence claim metaphysically loaded rather than analytically secure.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Jaegwon Kim's 1984 formal reconstruction shows that under any mereologically closed property space, global supervenience and strong supervenience are provably co-extensional.
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    • 2.The supporting argument's counterexample tacitly restricts the B-base to local intrinsic properties, but global supervenience is defined over total world-histories including all relational and structural properties.
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    • 3.When the full relational structure of a world is included in the B-base, no two worlds can share a global B-distribution while harboring B-indiscernible yet A-discernible individuals, collapsing the alleged distinction.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    A single example that is consistent with global supervenience but inconsistent w...Global supervenience entails strong individual supervenience when combined with ...Global supervenience of A on B requires only that worlds with the same global di...Haecceitism—the doctrine that grounds the purported counterexamples—is itself a ...
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    If worlds are purely qualitative constructs with no primitive thisness, then ind...Jaegwon Kim's 1984 formal reconstruction shows that under any mereologically clo...Strong individual supervenience of A on B requires that any two possible worlds ...The supporting argument's counterexample tacitly restricts the B-base to local i...There exist possible worlds w1 and w2 where individual x in w1 is B-indiscernibl...When the full relational structure of a world is included in the B-base, no two ...

    Similar

    Global supervenience fails to entail strong individual supervenience93%Global supervenience and strong supervenience are not equivalent92%Global supervenience fails to entail weak individual supervenience89%Global supervenience does not entail strong supervenience88%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: supervenience
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    The existence of w1 and w2 is incompatible with the thesis that A strongly individually supervenes on B because x in w1 is B-indiscernible but A-discernible from x* in w2. But the existence of these worlds is not itself a counterexample to the global supervenience of A on B. Since w1 and w2 do not have the same global pattern of distribution of B-properties, it seems not to matter that the worlds do not have the same global pattern of distribution of A-properties. Thus Petrie claimed that “since
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Worlds w1 and w2 do not share the same global pattern of B-property distribution...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit