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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The term 'Bayesian inductive logic' carrying the connotation of purely subjective probabilities is misleading.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The Bayesian/non-Bayesian distinction for inductive logics should turn on whether the logic gives Bayes' theorem a prominent role.
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    • 2.Classical approaches to statistical inference developed by Fisher and by Neyman & Pearson largely eschew Bayes' theorem and are therefore non-Bayesian.
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    • 3.The current usage conflates the subjectivist/personalist account of belief with Bayesian inductive logic, which are distinct concepts.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.De Finetti's representation theorem grounds Bayesian updating in exchangeability, a structural constraint, not purely subjective degrees of belief.
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    • 2.Objective Bayesians like Jaynes and Williamson derive prior probabilities from logical or epistemic constraints, decoupling Bayesianism from subjectivism.
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    • 3.Labeling the framework 'subjective' obscures that Bayes' theorem is a mathematical theorem valid across all interpretations of probability.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Harold Jeffreys developed a fully Bayesian inductive logic using objective, invariant priors derived from the Fisher information metric, not personal credences.
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    • 2.The conflation of 'Bayesian' with 'subjective' tacitly privileges the Savage-Ramsey personalist tradition over equally rigorous objective Bayesian programs.
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    • 3.Carnap's inductive logic uses confirmation functions satisfying Bayesian coherence without any commitment to purely subjective probability assignments.
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