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    The theory conception and object conception of the physic... — Carmelics
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    Perspectives
    108,905
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    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    The theory conception and object conception of the physical are best understood as ways of understanding the notion of the physical, not as reductive analyses.

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.There is no reason to suppose that the theory or object conception provides anything other than a way of understanding the notion of the physical.
      ?

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    • 2.Concepts can be legitimately understood without reductive analysis.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Hempel's dilemma shows that 'physical' must be defined by a specific theory or face vacuity, demanding more than mere 'ways of understanding'.
      ?

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    • 2.If the theory conception merely gestures at physics without fixing reference, it cannot distinguish physical from non-physical properties in principle.
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    • 3.A notion that resists reductive analysis but still does explanatory work in physicalism commits the deflationist to an unexplained primitive.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Strawson and Levine argue that without a reductive account of 'physical', physicalism becomes trivially true by absorbing any ontology it encounters.
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    • 2.A non-reductive 'way of understanding' the physical lacks the normative bite needed to rule out panpsychist or dualist ontologies as non-physical.
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    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

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    Philosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    A non-reductive 'way of understanding' the physical lacks the normative bite nee...A notion that resists reductive analysis but still does explanatory work in phys...Concepts can be legitimately understood without reductive analysis.Hempel's dilemma shows that 'physical' must be defined by a specific theory or f...
    +3 moreShow less
    If the theory conception merely gestures at physics without fixing reference, it...Strawson and Levine argue that without a reductive account of 'physical', physic...There is no reason to suppose that the theory or object conception provides anyt...

    Similar

    There is no reason to interpret the theory or object conception as pro...92%There is no reason to suppose that the theory or object conception pro...90%The theory-conception and object-conception of the physical may define...90%Circularity is only a problem if the theory or object conception is in...88%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: physicalism
    View source passageHide passage
    However, the response to this is that circularity is only a problem if the conceptions are interpreted as providing a reductive analysis of the notion of the physical. But there is no reason why they should be interpreted in that way. After all, we have many concepts that we understand without knowing how to analyze (cf. Lewis 1970). So there seems no reason to suppose that either the theory or object conception is providing anything else but a way of understanding the notion of the physical.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit