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    The truth-value of 'p is unknown' is determined by the ac... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Kvanvig has no grounds for thinking that Fitch's conjunction does not designate rigidly

    The truth-value of 'p is unknown' is determined by the actual epistemic situation fixed at context, not by varying epistemic states across circumstances of evaluation, making it extensionally stable across worlds.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Epistemic facts about what agents actually know are determined by context-fixed conditions, not hypothetical alternative scenarios.
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    • 2.Truth-values should track objective facts about the world rather than varying across merely possible epistemic circumstances.
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    • 3.If 'p is unknown' varied truth-value across worlds, speakers would lack stable reference to their actual epistemic situation.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Modal claims about epistemic states (could know, might discover) seem to require truth-value variation across possible circumstances.
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    • 2.Counterfactual scenarios where agents have different evidence appear to make 'p is unknown' false even if true in the actual context.
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    • 3.Extensional stability conflicts with semantic theories where modal and epistemic operators shift truth-conditions across possible worlds.
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    Key Terms

    Epistemic
    "Epistemic" relates to knowledge—how we know things, what counts as knowledge, and whether we can trust what we believe to be true. It comes from the Greek word for knowledge and is used to describe questions about the reliability and validity of our beliefs and understanding. For example, "epistemic humility" means acknowledging the limits of what you can actually know for certain.
    Worlds(as used in metaphysics and modal logic)
    In philosophy, 'worlds' are different possible ways reality could be—like alternate universes or scenarios. Philosophers use them to think through what *could* be true, not just what *is* true.
    circumstances of evaluation(Formal semantics, referencing a prior theoretical role outlined elsewhere in the text)
    Things made up of indices; they play the theoretical role of being what propositions are evaluated relative to in order to determine truth-values
    context(Used in the Kaplanian framework to distinguish the circumstance of utterance from the content expressed)
    A situation of utterance that supplies parameters (such as the speaker) used to determine the content of context-sensitive expressions.
    epistemology(Contrasted with purely descriptive scientific inquiry)
    A normative enterprise that tells us how we ought to reason from evidence and how we ought to justify our beliefs, as distinct from merely describing how we do reason or justify beliefs
    extensionally stable(logic and formal semantics)
    Something that has the same meaning or value in all different possible situations or worlds—it doesn't change depending on circumstances.
    truth-value(logic and philosophy of language)
    Whether a statement is true or false. Two statements can have different truth-values if one is true and the other is false.

    Connections

    2 topics

    No other argument is better1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Counterfactual scenarios where agents have different evidence appear to make 'p ...Epistemic facts about what agents actually know are determined by context-fixed ...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Extensional stability conflicts with semantic theories where modal and epistemic...
    If 'p is unknown' varied truth-value across worlds, speakers would lack stable r...
    +3 moreShow less
    Kvanvig has no grounds for thinking that Fitch's conjunction does not designate ...Modal claims about epistemic states (could know, might discover) seem to require...Truth-values should track objective facts about the world rather than varying ac...