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    The use of heuristics—including potentially unsound ones—... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    The use of heuristics—including potentially unsound ones—can fall within a generalized account of rationality.

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Human agents face resource limitations that make computationally optimal reasoning infeasible.
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    • 2.Heuristics considered by cognitive psychologists may be of benefit to agents in certain circumstances.
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    • 3.A theory of rationality informed by computational complexity theory should accommodate feasible inference strategies.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Rationality norms are normative ideals that cannot be reduced to descriptive accounts of what agents can feasibly accomplish.
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    • 2.Kant's distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives shows that resource constraints are empirical facts, not rational standards.
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    • 3.Accommodating unsound inference to feasibility collapses the is-ought distinction central to any defensible theory of rationality.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Aristotle's phronesis requires that practical wisdom aim at truth, not merely at computationally tractable approximations of truth.
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    • 2.Permitting unsound heuristics under a 'generalized' rationality standard removes the normative traction needed to distinguish good from bad reasoning.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

    Connections

    3 topics

    Truth & Knowledge2 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linkedSkepticism1 linked

    Related

    A theory of rationality informed by computational complexity theory should accom...Accommodating unsound inference to feasibility collapses the is-ought distinctio...Aristotle's phronesis requires that practical wisdom aim at truth, not merely at...Heuristics considered by cognitive psychologists may be of benefit to agents in ...
    +4 moreShow less
    Human agents face resource limitations that make computationally optimal reasoni...Kant's distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives shows that r...

    Similar

    The use of heuristics — including potentially unsound ones — should be...99%The use of potentially unsound heuristics should be regarded as fallin...98%Overall rationality is the all-things-considered perspective that acco...72%There are various kinds of rationality, including moral, epistemic, an...72%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: computational-complexity
    View source passageHide passage
    Note, however, that such theorists are typically careful to avoid explicitly asserting that there are only finitely many feasible numbers. g. those given in the formulation of (S2). Certainly the claim that there is a largest feasibly constructible number would invite the challenge that the strict finitist nominate such a number \(n\). And any such nomination would in turn invite the rejoinder that if \(n\) is feasibly constructible, then \(n+1\) must be as well. But in the sort of model \(\math
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Permitting unsound heuristics under a 'generalized' rationality standard removes...
    Rationality norms are normative ideals that cannot be reduced to descriptive acc...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit