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    The view that genocide is wrong because it is contrary to... — Carmelics
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    The view that genocide is wrong because it is contrary to God's will does not provide an answer to the moral skeptic

    Natural TheologySkepticism
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Moral skeptics demand foundations that are epistemically independent of the very moral intuitions they doubt, not merely restatements of those intuitions.
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    • 2.Divine command theory, on any voluntarist reading from Ockham to Adams, grounds wrongness in God's will rather than deriving God's will from prior wrongness.
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    • 3.Yet the skeptic can simply ask why God's will generates obligations, pushing the regress back one level without resolution—the arbitrariness problem remains undefeated.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Plausible responses to moral skepticism must provide non-question-begging epistemic access to moral facts, not merely relocate their source.
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    • 2.Appealing to divine will replaces the epistemological question—how do we know genocide is wrong?—with an equally contested theological question about God's existence and knowable commands.
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    • 3.A proposed foundation that introduces greater epistemic uncertainty than the original moral claim fails to satisfy the skeptic's demand for justification, as Flew's 'No-see-um' critique of natural theology implies.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.For the appeal to God's will to be non-arbitrary, God's prohibition must be grounded in the independent wrongness of genocide
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    • 2.If God's prohibition is grounded in the independent wrongness of genocide, then moral wrongness is conceptually prior to and separate from God's will
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    • 3.An appeal to God's will that presupposes independent moral wrongness cannot serve as a foundation for moral knowledge
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    Topics

    SkepticismNatural Theology

    Connections

    4 topics

    Against an attribute of God3 linkedTruth & Knowledge1 linkedJustice & Punishment1 linkedMoral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    A proposed foundation that introduces greater epistemic uncertainty than the ori...An appeal to God's will that presupposes independent moral wrongness cannot serv...Appealing to divine will replaces the epistemological question—how do we know ge...Divine command theory, on any voluntarist reading from Ockham to Adams, grounds ...
    +5 moreShow less
    For the appeal to God's will to be non-arbitrary, God's prohibition must be grou...If God's prohibition is grounded in the independent wrongness of genocide, then ...

    Similar

    The objection that some moral beliefs must be true because some moral ...75%Using a belief in moral wrongness to refute moral nihilism assumes wha...74%Resolvable moral disagreements do not support moral skepticism74%Wielenberg's view offers no personal grounding for ethical truths, lea...73%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: moral-epistemology
    View source passageHide passage
    The latter problem arises from a dilemma posed in Plato’s Euthyphro. In this dialogue Euthyphro tries to explain to Socrates that piety is what the gods love. Socrates then asks Euthyphro whether the gods love the pious because they are good or whether the pious are good because the gods love them. To put the dilemma in terms relevant to the present context, consider the view that genocide is wrong because it is contrary to God’s will. (The argument doesn’t change if we talk about commandments o
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Moral skeptics demand foundations that are epistemically independent of the very...
    Plausible responses to moral skepticism must provide non-question-begging episte...
    Yet the skeptic can simply ask why God's will generates obligations, pushing the...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit