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    The view that v(f(Q)) is an ontologically dependent prope... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The view that v(f(Q)) is an ontologically dependent property (depending on v(Q)) rather than self-sustained faces pressing difficulties as a defense of contextualist hidden variables.

    Truth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Dependent co-arising in the Madhyamaka philosophical tradition and its formal analogues in structuralist metaphysics (cf. Ladyman & Ross) establish that ontological dependence between properties is coherent and does not entail the dependent property is less real.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.P4's dilemma assumes that v'(f(Q)) ≠ v(f(Q)) is implausible, but under functional dependence, functional consistency requires only that f applied to the new base value v'(Q) yields the correct eigenvalue, which is a constraint satisfied, not violated, by context-change.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts already accepts that distinct experimental arrangements constitute distinct phenomena, so the coexistence of v(f(Q)) and v'(f(Q)) across contexts reflects genuine phenomenal plurality, not ontological incoherence.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On a relational ontology (cf. Rovelli's relational QM), properties are constitutively indexed to interactions, so v(f(Q)) relative to a P-measurement context is not the same property switching in and out but a distinct relational fact.
      ?

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    • 2.The switching objection (P5) presupposes a context-independent carrier of properties, but a thoroughgoing relationist denies any such substrate, dissolving the apparent absurdity of values appearing and disappearing.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.This position does not reject questions about values of f(Q) in a P-measurement situation as illegitimate, since it does not rely on an observable being well-defined in only one context.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The position must concede that the system has a value v(Q) in a Q-measurement situation and a possibly different value v′(Q) in a P-measurement situation.
      ?

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    • 3.Questions about values of f(Q) in the P-measurement situation are therefore legitimate on this view.
      ?

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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Key Terms

    Contextualism (in philosophy of physics)(a theory being defended in this statement)
    The view that the properties of things can change depending on the context or situation in which we measure or observe them.
    Hidden variables(proposed as an alternative explanation for quantum phenomena)
    Invisible information or properties that particles might secretly possess, which could explain quantum behavior without needing to change our current theories.
    Ontologically dependent(as used in metaphysics)
    Relying on something else for its existence; not being able to exist on its own without that other thing.
    Self-sustained(contrasting with dependent properties)
    Able to exist or continue on its own without needing anything else to support it.
    property(Locke's demonstration of the moral proposition 'Where there is no property, there is no injustice.')
    A right to something.
    v(Q) and v(f(Q)) notation(technical notation for expressing the relationship between properties)
    Symbolic shorthand where v stands for 'value,' Q is a variable, and f(Q) means 'some function applied to Q'—essentially representing how properties relate to each other mathematically.

    Related

    Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts already accepts that distinct experimental...Both options allow one to switch v(f(Q)) in and out of existence, or switch betw...Dependent co-arising in the Madhyamaka philosophical tradition and its formal an...Neither available answer is plausible: either v′(Q) implies a distinct v′(f(Q)) ...
    +6 moreShow less
    On a relational ontology (cf. Rovelli's relational QM), properties are constitut...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: kochen-specker
    View source passageHide passage
    (a) We might think that v(f(Q)) just is not a self-sustained physical property, but one which ontologically depends on the presence of another property v(Q). (Recall that in the proof of FUNC v(f(Q)) is constructed from v(Q).) But, since the position does not reject questions about values of f(Q) in a P-measurement situation as illegitimate (because it does not trade on a notion of an observable being well-defined in one context only!), this seems to lead to new and pressing questions, to say t
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    P4's dilemma assumes that v'(f(Q)) ≠ v(f(Q)) is implausible, but under functiona...
    Questions about values of f(Q) in the P-measurement situation are therefore legi...
    The position must concede that the system has a value v(Q) in a Q-measurement si...
    The switching objection (P5) presupposes a context-independent carrier of proper...
    This position does not reject questions about values of f(Q) in a P-measurement ...

    Similar

    A particular property instance is ontologically dependent on the subst...77%A particular substance is not ontologically dependent on any given pro...76%The holistic contextualist view that f(Q) is well-defined only given a...74%Causal contextuality does not imply that the ontological status of the...74%
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit