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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The view that v(f(Q)) is an ontologically dependent property (depending on v(Q)) rather than self-sustained faces pressing difficulties as a defense of contextualist hidden variables.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.This position does not reject questions about values of f(Q) in a P-measurement situation as illegitimate, since it does not rely on an observable being well-defined in only one context.
      ?

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    • 2.The position must concede that the system has a value v(Q) in a Q-measurement situation and a possibly different value v′(Q) in a P-measurement situation.
      ?

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    • 3.Questions about values of f(Q) in the P-measurement situation are therefore legitimate on this view.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Dependent co-arising in the Madhyamaka philosophical tradition and its formal analogues in structuralist metaphysics (cf. Ladyman & Ross) establish that ontological dependence between properties is coherent and does not entail the dependent property is less real.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.P4's dilemma assumes that v'(f(Q)) ≠ v(f(Q)) is implausible, but under functional dependence, functional consistency requires only that f applied to the new base value v'(Q) yields the correct eigenvalue, which is a constraint satisfied, not violated, by context-change.
      ?

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    • 3.Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts already accepts that distinct experimental arrangements constitute distinct phenomena, so the coexistence of v(f(Q)) and v'(f(Q)) across contexts reflects genuine phenomenal plurality, not ontological incoherence.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On a relational ontology (cf. Rovelli's relational QM), properties are constitutively indexed to interactions, so v(f(Q)) relative to a P-measurement context is not the same property switching in and out but a distinct relational fact.
      ?

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    • 2.The switching objection (P5) presupposes a context-independent carrier of properties, but a thoroughgoing relationist denies any such substrate, dissolving the apparent absurdity of values appearing and disappearing.
      ?

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